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Abstract
We conduct a lab experiment to investigate an important corporate prediction market setting:
A manager needs information about the state of a project, which workers have, in order to
make a state-dependent decision. Workers can potentially reveal this information by trading
in a corporate prediction market. We test two different market designs to determine which
provides more information to the manager and leads to better decisions. We also investigate
the effect of top-down advice from the market designer to participants on how the prediction
market is intended to function. Our results show that the theoretically superior market design
performs worse in the lab—in terms of manager decisions—without top-down advice. With
advice, manager decisions improve and both market designs perform similarly well, although
the theoretically superior market design features less mis-pricing. We provide a behavioral
explanation for the failure of the theoretical predictions and discuss implications for corporate
prediction markets in the field.
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1 Introduction
Many important corporate decisions depend on information about future conditions. Whether
to fund the development of a new technology, whether to assign more resources to a project, or
how many inputs to order for production: The answers to these questions depend on uncertain
variables like the future demand of the technology, future problems with the project, and future
sales. Thus, better information about these future conditions can help improve decision-making.
Prediction markets are one forecasting mechanism that has received a lot of attention in pre-
dicting public events like election outcomes (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1992; Wolfers and Zitzewitz,
2004). A typical market trades an asset that pays off 1 if event A occurs in the future, and 0
otherwise. Traders can either buy or sell these assets. If many traders believe that A will occur,
their trading will drive up the price of the asset, which creates a “wisdom of crowds” prediction
of event A’s probability. Since money is at stake, these markets provide incentives to acquire and
reveal information (e.g., Page and Siemroth, 2017). Moreover, the logic of the efficient market
hypothesis suggests that these markets aggregate information that is dispersed among traders.
Indeed, prediction markets have been shown to outperform both polls (e.g., Berg et al., 2008) and
experts (e.g., Spann and Skiera, 2009).
Hence, prediction markets could be a valuable tool in corporations and organizations, and more
generally, policy makers and decision makers might improve real (non-financial) decisions based
on information inferred from asset prices. For example, central banks might glean information
about economic fundamentals or inflation expectations from financial markets (e.g., Bernanke
and Woodford, 1997), and bond prices might reveal information about bank health to regulators
and help them to audit or intervene (e.g., Prescott, 2012; Sundaresan and Wang, 2015). But
theoretical models show that not every asset or every market is expected to be equally useful in
providing pertinent information for decision-making: In some situations, the incentives of traders
and decision makers are not aligned, whereas in others they are. This presents a market or
asset design problem, and in this paper we test two market designs experimentally in a corporate
prediction market setting to see which helps to improve a binary state-dependent decision.
Some firms are already using prediction markets, and several software companies now offer
corporate prediction market packages as a service to clients.1 Still, research on corporate prediction
markets is relatively scarce. Cowgill and Zitzewitz (2015) analyzed corporate prediction markets
in three large corporations and found that they outperformed expert forecasts that had been
previously used as a basis for decisions. In this project, rather than analyzing existing designs, we
instead ask how such markets should be designed. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to investigate how prediction markets inform decision making, whereas previous papers almost
exclusively studied forecasting quality. For the more general problem of decision makers using
information from financial market prices, the literature is almost exclusively theoretical, so we
provide one of the first tests of the theory and how it can be used for market design.
In our corporate framing, a manager needs information about whether a project deadline will
be met in order to decide whether to invest additional resources into the project at a cost. Workers
on the project are informed of the state of this project, but managers are not. One interpretation
is that programmers on the project are intimately aware of the progress and potential problems,
1Examples include Consensus Point, Cultivate Labs, or Lumenogic.
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whereas the manager is not. If the state of the project is bad, then the project will miss the
deadline unless it receives additional resources. If the state is good, then the deadline will be met
even without additional resources. Since the optimal manager decision depends on the state of
the project, we can test different prediction market designs—where workers trade and potentially
reveal their information to managers—to see which leads to better decisions.
The straightforward market design that is already in use (e.g., Cowgill and Zitzewitz, 2015)
trades an asset that pays off 1 if the deadline is met and 0 otherwise (the “deadline asset”).
However, Siemroth (2020) showed that traders have poor incentives to reveal their information in
this design. If workers bet on a missed deadline in the bad state, then this drives down prices
and signals to the manager to assign additional resources, which in turn leads to the deadline
being met and traders losing money. Thus, workers are punished for revealing their information.
In technical terms, there is no equilibrium where workers reveal their information. Intuitively,
workers predicting a missed deadline suffer from a self-defeating prophecy, as their prediction
triggers a manager reaction that falsifies the prediction.
An alternative market design addressing these incentive problems uses an asset that pays off
1 if the manager assigns additional resources, and 0 if not (the “action asset”, Siemroth, 2020).
Here, a revealing equilibrium exists: Workers trade at high prices in the bad state (suggesting to
invest additional resources) and at low prices in the good state (suggesting not to invest), and
the manager follows these “market recommendations.” Thus, this alternative market design aligns
incentives between workers and managers. However, this design also features multiple equilibria
and only one of them corresponds to the positive outcome where information is revealed.
In a lab experiment, we test these two market designs against each other in terms of managerial
decision quality. We also run supporting experiments that investigate whether a fictitious “CEO
message” can improve information transmission and decision-making. The CEO message explains
the purpose of the prediction markets and describes a revealing trading strategy. Hence, it can
be viewed as offering advice to subjects on how to act. The inclusion of the advice treatments
was motivated by a sense that the interaction between the prediction market and the manager’s
decision is sufficiently subtle that subjects might benefit from a description of how these markets
can plausibly operate. Moreover, the CEO message can help to facilitate coordination in the
financial markets based on the action asset, which feature multiple equilibria.
Based on our 2 × 2 experimental design (varying the market design and the presence of the
CEO message), our first main finding is that the theoretically superior market design actually
leads to worse manager decisions in the absence of the CEO message. This is because workers play
non-equilibrium strategies in the markets with the deadline asset, which leads to better manager
decisions than predicted by theory. Furthermore, workers play the non-revealing equilibrium in
markets with the action asset, which leads to worse decisions than if play corresponded to the
fully revealing equilibrium. Our explanation for worker/trader behavior in these two treatments
is based on incorrect beliefs: Their behavior is consistent with the mistaken belief that managers
do not react to the information contained in prediction market prices. In the language of Eyster
et al. (2019), workers appear to incorrectly believe that managers are cursed, i.e., that managers
are unable to infer the informational content of prices. Our behavioral explanation can account
for all observed qualitative results and exactly predicts the average price levels in three out of four
state-treatment cells.
3
Our second main finding is that the CEO message—advice to use a revealing trading strategy—
significantly improves both the information revealed by the prediction markets and managerial
decisions by up to 25 percentage points. With the CEO message, managerial decisions between
the two market designs are no longer significantly different, although the point estimate on correct
managerial decisions is 9 percentage points higher with the action asset. A secondary criterion
favoring the action asset design is that it exhibits significantly less mis-pricing, which should make
it more stable. Thus, managerial decision quality being roughly equal, a practical recommendation
would be to use the action asset design with top-down advice akin to our CEO message.
Our findings have at least two important implications. First, absent advice, subjects are unable
to realize the theoretically superior outcome of the action asset market design. This suggests that
a theory based on rational expectations is not well-suited for mechanism design with inexperienced
players in this complex setting. Even in the last few rounds of the experiment, after allowing for
experience and potential learning, subjects do not converge towards the theoretical predictions.
Our behavioral explanation suggests that incorrect beliefs among traders drive this result, which
can potentially be corrected via communication by the market designer.
Second, while the treatments without the CEO message provide valuable insights into strategic
reasoning in interactive market settings, these conditions are unlikely to prevail in the field. If a
firm implements a corporate prediction market to aid in managerial decisions, then it would also
explicitly communicate the purpose of the market and explain how it is meant to be used. This is
precisely what our CEO message does, and we show it improves outcomes significantly. In Section
5, we also discuss some methodological implications for experimental economists.
We have a few remarks about our design choices. First, we study a setting in which the
state of the project is common knowledge among workers, rather than a more general setting in
which workers have asymmetric information. However, the ability of financial markets to at least
partially aggregate private information has been extensively researched and is well-documented in
the experimental literature. Moreover, it is not the focus of this paper. For these reasons, we chose
the simplest possible information structure that still allows us to shed light on our main research
question: whether asset prices can be used to improve decision making, when these decisions
in turn feed back into asset values. Second, if we take our setting literally, it is reasonable to
ask whether a prediction market is even necessary: In other words, can the manager learn the
state of the project simply by asking any individual worker? In many relevant cases, we believe
the answer is no. An individual worker might be reluctant to reveal the state of the project to
the manager, for a variety of reasons outside of both the theoretical model and the experiment.
For instance, workers might fear that the manager will “shoot the messenger” for delivering bad
news. A prediction market mitigates this problem by offering anonymity to participants, with
the additional benefit of providing financial incentives for information revelation (unlike the flat
incentives that arise when the manager just asks an individual worker). Finally, our experiment
controls for other forces that might also be at play in workplace environments. This allows for a
cleaner and more direct test of the underlying theory. We further discuss this issue in Section 5.
Overall, the potential of prediction markets to improve decisions is often mentioned but rarely
investigated or explicitly allowed in experimental settings. Hence, our main contributions are to
show how prediction markets can aid decision making and to demonstrate that the choice of market
design very much affects information revelation and subsequent decision quality. To the best of our
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knowledge, we are the first to experimentally study prediction market design for the purpose of
improving organizational decisions. In addition, our investigation of top-down advice in a complex
market signaling game is novel and valuable for corporate applications.
1.1 Literature
While the framing of a project deadline we consider here may appear somewhat specific, our setting
gives insights into the more general problem of a decision-maker having to make a state-dependent
decision, which is informed by traders in a financial market. This possibility has been considered in
several theoretical papers in other contexts, for example managers learning from financial market
prices to decide upon investment opportunities (e.g., Bond et al., 2010; Bond and Goldstein, 2015;
Edmans et al., 2015; Dow et al., 2017) or central banks learning from financial market prices to
decide upon monetary policy (e.g., Bernanke and Woodford, 1997). Indeed, though the framing
differs, our setting is formally very close to Bernanke and Woodford (1997)’s static model when
considering only two states and two decisions, so the problem we investigate is of interest beyond
corporate prediction markets.
In the prediction market literature, several studies have investigated the informational efficiency
of these markets in non-corporate settings, such as Oliven and Rietz (2004); Berg et al. (2008); Page
and Clemen (2013) based on field data or Page and Siemroth (2017, 2019); Corgnet et al. (2018,
2019); Choo et al. (2019) based on experimental data. The evidence on markets incorporating
public information is positive, although the experimental work shows that there is typically under-
reaction to private information (the latter paper being an exception). The experimental literature
has also investigated potential problems of prediction markets, such as manipulation, where the
evidence is mixed (Hanson et al., 2006; Deck et al., 2013). Moreover, thin markets with very few
traders were found to hamper information aggregation (Healy et al., 2010). Ledyard et al. (2009)
investigate prediction markets when the number of variables to be predicted is large, and find that
performance suffers in this case.
Studies with field data from corporate prediction markets are very rare. Cowgill and Zitzewitz
(2015) provide analyses of markets from three different major companies and find that they improve
upon the tools used before. However, they also identify an optimism bias where assets based on
events that would be positive for the company are overpriced. Plott and Chen (2002) use corporate
prediction markets to forecast sales. They find the market forecasts are an improvement over the
existing forecasting methods. Gillen et al. (2017) use a parimutuel betting rather than a prediction
market mechanism to forecast sales in a company, and find that the mechanism outperforms the
existing forecasting techniques.
There are very few studies of settings where markets can affect non-market decisions. Kogan
et al. (2011) consider a setting where subjects in a group choose an effort level in a coordination
game. A pre-play prediction market could potentially help to facilitate coordination by letting
subjects bet on the effort levels in the subsequent coordination game. However, they find that
prediction markets actually decrease effort levels in the coordination game and lead to worse
outcomes. Our setting differs, because in our case the market can potentially reveal information
about a state variable that the decision maker needs but does not have. Moreover, we consider a
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concrete corporate setting where markets are already used, whereas Kogan et al. (2011) consider
an abstract setting.
Davis et al. (2014) investigate whether financial markets can help a regulator make a conversion
decision for contingent convertible bonds. They consider a prediction market as an additional tool
to provide information and find that the treatment with the additional prediction market does
best. In contrast to our setting, the prediction market is only a minor addition in one treatment
that coexists with the market for contingent convertibles, which is the focus of their study.
2 Theory and predictions
2.1 Model set-up
This section introduces a simple setting whose qualitative predictions we test in the lab, but many
features of the model such as information structures, state spaces etc. can be generalized (see
Siemroth, 2020).
Players. A corporate prediction market consists of N ≥ 2 competitive and risk neutral
workers/traders indexed by i = 1, . . . , N , and a risk neutral manager/decision maker. Workers are
endowed with a budget of 0 < w <∞ in cash and e > 0 units of the risky asset.
State of the project and information structure. The state of the project that workers
are working on is binary with θ ∈ {0, 1}, where θ = 1 is the good state and θ = 0 is the bad state.
The prior probability is Pr(θ = 1) = 0.5, i.e., the state of the project is good half of the time. All
workers observe the realization of θ, i.e., know whether the project is in a good state or in a bad
state, but the manager does not. The idea is that workers on the project have detailed information
about the progress and potential problems (e.g., programmers being aware of unanticipated bugs),
whereas the manager does not directly work on the project and hence does not have knowledge of
the state of the project.
Project deadline. Whether the deadline for the project will be reached depends on two
components, the state of the project θ and a manager decision d ∈ {0, 1}. In the experimental
frame, the manager decision d = 1 means the manager assigns more resources to the project at a
cost and d = 0 means she does not. The project deadline is reached if θ = 1 or d = 1 or both, i.e.,
if the state is good or more resources are assigned to the project. The project deadline is missed
if and only if θ = 0 and d = 0.
Assets. Traders can hold a risk-less asset with return normalized to zero (cash) and trade a
risky asset. In the currently practiced form of deadline prediction markets, the risky asset pays 1
if and only if the deadline is met, and 0 if the deadline is missed (see, e.g., Cowgill and Zitzewitz,
2015). We call this asset design the deadline asset. Formally, let the value of the deadline asset
be a(θ, d) = 1{d = 1 ∨ θ = 1}, where 1{.} is the indicator function.
In another treatment we use another risky asset. The action asset has a value of 1 if the
manager assigns additional resources to the project (d = 1) and a value of 0 if she does not (d = 0).
Formally, a(θ, d) = d. The prediction market either trades the deadline asset or the action asset,
not both. That is, we are comparing markets with the deadline asset to markets with the action
asset.
Timing. At t = 0 nature draws θ and workers observe it. At t = 1 workers trade in a
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Figure 1: Timeline with workers and manager.
competitive prediction market yielding a market clearing price p ∈ [0, 1]. At t = 2 the manager
can observe the prediction market price p, and make a decision based on (the information contained
in) the price p, d(p). At t = 3, assets pay out and payoffs realize. This timing is displayed in
Figure 1.
Payoffs. Workers receive a bonus bw ≥ 0 if the deadline is reached. Moreover, workers keep
their trading profits. They submit net demand functions xi(p), so their trading profit at price p is
[a(θ, d)− p]xi(p) (where xi(p) < 0 is a sale of the asset). Managers receive a bonus bm > 0 if the
deadline is reached. The managerial cost of assigning additional resources are c > 0 with bm > c.
Overall, the crucial feature in this model is that managers do not know the state of the project
θ, but would like to know it, because if the state is good then they can save the cost of assigning
additional resources. In the bad state managers want to assign additional resources, since it is
necessary to reach the deadline and the benefit outweighs the cost (bm > c). Because workers
know θ, they can potentially reveal that information to the manager via trading prices. This is
exactly the idea of prediction markets informing real (i.e., non-financial) decisions.
Our equilibrium concept is the standard one for competitive financial markets with asymmetric
information, except there is an additional player (the manager) who optimally reacts to whatever
information is revealed by prices, and this reaction (in particular its impact on asset values) is
correctly anticipated by traders. For a similar definition see Bond et al. (2010).
Definition 1. A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) with manager consists of
i. Optimal trader net demands for the risky asset given their information and the information
revealed in prices,
xi(p, θ) = arg max
x
E[x(a(θ, d(p))− p)|p(θ) = p, θ] ∀i
s.t. xp ≤ w, x ≥ −e
ii. an optimal manager decision function d(p) given the information revealed in prices,
d(p) = arg max
d∈{0,1}
Eθ[1{d = 1 ∨ θ = 1}bm − dc|p(θ) = p],
iii. and a price function p(θ) that clears the market for every θ ∈ {0, 1}, i.e.,
N∑
i=1
xi(p = p(θ), θ) = 0 ∀θ.
A fully revealing equilibrium is an equilibrium with p(θ = 0) 6= p(θ = 1), i.e., where market
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clearing prices differ by state, so that the manager can infer the state. A non-revealing equilibrium
is an equilibrium with p(θ = 0) = p(θ = 1).
2.2 Analysis and predictions
The main question is whether the incentives are aligned in such a corporate prediction market
so that workers trade in a way that reveals their information when they correctly anticipate the
manager reaction to prices.2 That is, we ask whether there is a fully revealing equilibrium. Such
an equilibrium might not exist, because the manager reacts to trading prices, so traders may
inadvertently be punished for revealing their information to the manager. More generally, an
equilibrium non-existence can arise because asset values are endogenous to a third party’s decision
that reacts to prices (e.g., Bernanke and Woodford, 1997; Bond et al., 2010; Siemroth, 2019).
The following propositions determine whether revealing equilibria exist. The proofs are in the
appendix.
Proposition 1 (Deadline asset).
i. In a corporate prediction market with deadline asset, there exists no fully revealing equilibrium.
ii. A non-revealing equilibrium exists if and only if bm/2 ≥ c. In this equilibrium, the manager
always assigns additional resources, the deadline is always met, and the prediction market
always predicts that the deadline will be met (p(θ) = 1 ∀θ).
In the experiment we chose parameters such that bm/2 = c, hence a non-revealing equilibrium
exists but no fully revealing one. Thus, the theoretical prediction for prediction markets with
deadline assets is not good: This asset design means that information revelation by traders is not
incentive compatible.
The reason is quite simple: In a fully revealing equilibrium, prices have to differ by state for
information revelation to occur, but due to the manager decision the asset value would be the same
in all states, as the deadline is always met. In a competitive market, this cannot be an equilibrium
outcome: Prices have to equal (expected) asset values.
Specifically, traders want to trade at a price less than 1 only if the asset value is less than
1. Clearly, in the good state that can never be the case as the deadline is always reached. But
potentially the asset value can be less than 1 in the bad state. So suppose traders always trade at
p = 1 in the good state and at p < 1 in the bad state, making market prices fully revealing: The
manager can invert the price function and infer the underlying state of the project. This means
that the manager always assigns additional resources in the bad state but not in the good one, so
the deadline is met even in the bad state. But this cannot be an equilibrium, because for a price
p < 1 and an asset value of 1, every trader wants to buy assets, but then markets cannot clear and
prices would have to adjust upwards in the bad state, until prices are no longer revealing.
Proposition 2 (Action asset).
2That last part is crucial, because if traders do not anticipate any reaction to trading prices, then this is just
a standard financial market with exogenous asset values, for which a fully revealing equilibrium generically exists
(Radner, 1979).
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i. In a corporate prediction market with action asset, there exists a fully revealing equilibrium
with p(θ = 1) = 0 and p(θ = 0) = 1.
ii. A non-revealing pure strategy equilibrium exists. If bm/2 ≥ c, then the non-revealing equi-
librium is p(θ) = 1 ∀θ and the manager always assigns additional resources. If bm/2 < c,
then the non-revealing equilibrium is p(θ) = 0 ∀θ and the manager never assigns additional
resources.
iii. A continuum of non-revealing mixed strategy equilibria exists if bm/2 = c. In these equilib-
ria, prices are state-independent with p(θ) = α ∀θ with α ∈ [0, 1], and the manager assigns
additional resources with probability α.
The action asset improves the incentives for information revelation, because a fully revealing
equilibrium exists. The action asset pays off a positive amount if the manager assigns additional
resources. Thus, unlike with the deadline asset, the asset value does not depend on the outcome
(whether or not the deadline is reached) which the manager seeks to manipulate.
The fully revealing equilibrium with the action asset can be interpreted as a recommendation
by traders to the manager: A price of p = 1 in the bad state predicts that the manager assigns
additional resources, and a price of p = 0 in the good state predicts the manager does not assign
additional resources. Because the manager only wants to assign additional resources in the bad
state, it is in her own best interest to follow the “recommendation” by the market: Additional
resources if and only if the state is bad, i.e., if and only if p = 1. Thus, this recommendation is
self-fulfilling, and this is why it is an equilibrium.
But the action asset also has an undesirable feature: equilibrium multiplicity. While the fully
revealing equilibrium always exists, so does at least one non-revealing equilibrium. Nevertheless,
the theory favors the action asset with a fully revealing equilibrium over the deadline asset where
no fully revealing equilibrium exists. Thus, for all parameter values, the theoretical prediction is
that the action asset should lead to better manager decisions, because the traders have incentives
to reveal their information via trading, unlike in the case of the deadline asset.
Prediction 1. Existence of fully revealing equilibrium: The action asset leads to (i) more accurate
manager beliefs about the state and to (ii) better manager decisions compared to the deadline asset.
Moreover, if equilibrium multiplicity and coordination on an equilibrium are a problem, then
we might expect there to be more variation in prices with the action asset. This is an important
consideration for corporate prediction markets, as more variation in prices makes the information
contained in prices harder to interpret.
Prediction 2. Equilibrium multiplicity: The action asset leads to larger variance of prices com-
pared to the deadline asset.
When taking the theory to the lab, we also run supporting experiments in which a fictitious
“CEO message” is provided to the subjects and read aloud before the start of the session. The
purpose of the CEO message is to provide additional context for the prediction market and to
make non-binding suggestions to the subjects for how to behave. Notably, these suggestions are
different for the two asset market designs.3 Our decision to include a CEO message in both
3The CEO messages for both the deadline asset and the action asset are provided in the appendix.
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treatments is motivated by the desire to more carefully sort out alternative explanations for why
the CEO message might be effective. In the action asset market, the CEO message provides
a recommendation that is consistent with the fully revealing equilibrium. In the deadline asset
market, the CEO message provides a recommendation that is not consistent with any equilibrium.
If subjects implement the recommended strategies outlined in the CEO message for both market
designs, then we have evidence in favor of the “experimenter demand effect” (i.e., subjects respond
to advice per se). If subjects implement the recommended strategies outlined in the CEO message
only for the action asset market, then we have evidence in favor of the “equilibrium effect” (i.e.,
subjects respond to self-enforcing advice).
Our intuition is that subjects will begin the experiment by implementing a version of the rec-
ommended strategies in both treatments. In that case, the equilibrium recommendations (for the
action asset) will persist while the non-equilibrium recommendations (for the deadline asset) will
provide incentives for subjects to deviate to other strategies. Indeed, this basic logic has been
confirmed by experimental studies that investigate the effectiveness of recommendations for medi-
ating equilibrium selection in coordination games (e.g., Brandts and MacLeod, 1995; Van Huyck
et al., 1992). This allows us to make the following prediction:
Prediction 3. The CEO message improves manager decisions for the action asset, but not for
the deadline asset.
3 Experimental Design
Table 1 provides a summary of our experimental design. We use a 2× 2 experimental design that
varies (1) whether the asset pays out depending on the deadline or the manager action and (2)
whether an asset-specific CEO message is included, resulting in a total of four treatments. Each
session of each treatment consists of either one or two cohorts, where a cohort is a fixed group of
12 subjects.4 Each cohort participates in 11 rounds (1 practice round and 10 rounds that count),
where each round corresponds to a single play of a prediction market that mirrors the model with
the timing from Figure 1.5
We now describe the general structure of the experiment. Payoffs in the experiment are ex-
pressed in tokens, where 6 tokens = £1. Before the start of the experiment, experimental instruc-
tions are handed out to the subjects and read aloud.6 Subjects have the opportunity to ask any
clarification questions, which are answered publicly. In the message treatments (DC and AC), a
fictitious CEO message—which explains the purpose of the prediction markets—is then handed
out to subjects and also read aloud (see the appendix for the exact wording). In the no-message
treatments (DN and AN), this message is omitted.
4Thus, each session consists of either 12 or 24 subjects. In sessions with two cohorts, there is no interaction across
cohorts.
5A quiz and a practice round are two common methods of training subjects for an experiment. Both methods
have their disadvantages: a quiz typically includes examples or calculations that might implicitly tell subjects how
to behave, while a practice round might provide an opportunity for subjects to send costless signals to the other
players. Roth and Kagel (1995) discuss this tradeoff in more detail in the context of auction experiments. For our
experiment, we opted to include a practice round since it has the additional benefit of familiarizing subjects with
the experimental interface.
6The experimental instructions for the deadline asset treatments are provided in the appendix. The instructions
for the action asset treatments only differ in the explanation of how the asset pays off.
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At the beginning of the experiment, each subject is randomly assigned to the role of either a
worker or a manager. Each cohort of 12 subjects consists of 8 workers and 4 managers. Subjects’
roles are fixed across all rounds of the experiment.
In each round, each cohort faces a project deadline. The feasibility of meeting the project
deadline depends on the state of the project, which is randomly determined to be either “good” or
“bad” with equal probability. Workers, but not managers, are informed of the state of the project.
If the state of the project is good, then the project deadline is always met. If the state of the
project is bad, then the project deadline is only met if the manager decides to invest additional
resources into the project.
After the state of the project is realized, each worker receives a token endowment of 40 tokens
and an asset endowment of 4 units. The asset payoff depends on the treatment. In the deadline
asset treatments (DN and DC), each unit of the asset pays 10 tokens if the project deadline is
met, and 0 tokens otherwise. In the action asset treatments (AN and AC), each unit of the asset
pays 10 tokens if the manager decides to invest additional resources into the project, and 0 tokens
otherwise. In the remainder of the paper, we rescale the asset values (and prices) from [0, 10] to
[0, 1] to match the usual prediction market practice and to ease notation.
Workers participate in a prediction market organized as a standard continuous double auction,
where they are free to offer to buy/sell units of the asset for a price of their choosing (create limit
orders) or to accept the offers of others (execute market orders). Thus, the prediction market
either predicts whether the deadline will be met (DN and DC) or whether additional resources
will be assigned by the manager (AN and AC). Managers cannot trade, but they can observe the
trading of the workers and, in particular, the trading prices. Thus, the prediction market can
potentially inform managers. Trading closes after two minutes.
After the prediction market closes, each manager receives a trading summary consisting of a list
of all trading prices as well as the average trading price. Each manager then completes two tasks:
She decides whether to invest additional resources into the project (at a cost) and she reports her
belief about the likelihood that the state of the project is good.7
At the end of each round, payoffs are realized and reported to subjects on their computer
screens. For each manager, one of her two tasks is randomly selected to determine her round
payoff. If the investment decision is selected, the manager earns a salary of 30 tokens, receives a
bonus of 60 tokens if the project deadline is met, and incurs a cost of 30 tokens if she decided to
invest additional resources into the project. If the belief elicitation is selected, then the manager
earns 90 ·
(
1 − (1 − r100)
2
)
tokens if the state of the project is good and 90 ·
(




if the state of the project is bad, where r ∈ [0, 100] represents the manager’s reported probability
belief that the state is good.
For each cohort of 12 subjects (8 workers and 4 managers), the investment decision of one man-
ager is randomly selected to determine workers’ payoffs. Having four managers in every prediction
market, instead of just one, allows us to increase statistical power by generating four manager
decisions per round. Workers’ payoffs are determined based on their final portfolio holdings (in
tokens and assets). For example, a worker who does not trade has 4 assets and 40 tokens at the end
of the round, which can yield a maximum payoff of 80 tokens. In addition, each worker receives a
7We use the quadratic scoring rule for belief elicitation, which is incentive-compatible under the assumption of
risk-neutrality. We discuss the effectiveness of experimental methods at eliciting true beliefs in Section 5.
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Treatment
DN AN DC AC
Asset Type deadline action deadline action
CEO Message 7 7 3 3
Number of Cohorts 6 6 6 6
Number of Subjects 72 72 72 72
Table 1: A summary of our experimental treatments.
bonus of 10 tokens if the project deadline is met. Thus, 90 tokens is the maximum average payoff
of workers, which mirrors the maximum payoff of managers for either task.
At the end of the experiment, we elicit subjects’ risk preferences using the procedure of Gneezy
and Potters (1997).8,9 Subjects’ final earnings are the sum of their payoff from one randomly
selected round (out of the 10 rounds that count), their payoff from the risk elicitation task, and a
£5 show-up payment.
Implementation
The experiment was run at ESSEXLab at the University of Essex from October 2018 to Decem-
ber 2018. Subjects were recruited via email invitation from the student population. A total of
288 subjects participated in the experiment. Average subject earnings were £19.52 (including a
£5 show-up payment), with a minimum payment of £7 and a maximum payment of £41. The
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
4 Results
4.1 No-message treatments
Before going into detailed analyses of the treatment effects, we display summary statistics for the
main outcome variables in Table 2. The first three variables relate to manager outcomes, while
the last two describe market behavior. The first variable uses the responses from the incentivized
manager belief elicitation about the good state. CorrectBelief equals 1 if managers put 100% on
the realized state of the project, equals 0 if managers put 100% on the wrong state, and generally
equals b ∈ [0, 1] if managers put 100 · b% on the correct state.
The variable CorrectDecision takes a value of 1 if the manager makes the correct state-
dependent decision (i.e., invest additional resources if and only if the state is bad), and a value of
0 otherwise. The variable ManagerPayoff is the payoff of a manager from her decisions in a round,
which can be between 30 and 90, depending on the state and manager decisions.
The price variables refer to the prices of transactions, and we separately summarize these
8Although the Gneezy and Potters (1997) procedure does not allow for the estimation of risk preference pa-
rameters, we chose to use it for its relative simplicity and because it can be implemented with a single decision
task.
9In our version of the task, each subject receives an endowment of 10 tokens and must decide how many tokens
to invest in a risky project. The risky project pays out 2.5 times the amount invested with 50% probability. Any
tokens not invested in the risky project are kept by the subject.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of all outcome variables
Treatment CorrectBelief CorrectDecision ManagerPayoff Price bad state Price good state
DN
Mean 0.63 0.66 61.88 0.55 0.65
SD 0.28 0.47 19.41 0.20 0.24
N 240 240 240 878 489
AN
Mean 0.52 0.54 57.25 0.47 0.48
SD 0.26 0.50 19.21 0.18 0.18
N 240 240 240 988 577
DC
Mean 0.75 0.70 66.00 0.52 0.84
SD 0.29 0.46 20.20 0.24 0.17
N 240 240 240 643 536
AC
Mean 0.74 0.79 65.25 0.65 0.30
SD 0.30 0.41 17.85 0.25 0.21
N 240 240 240 915 652
All
Mean 0.66 0.67 62.59 0.55 0.55
SD 0.30 0.47 19.47 0.23 0.28
N 960 960 960 3424 2254
transaction prices for markets with a bad state of the project, and for a good state of the project.
This allows us to determine whether prices are informative about the state.
4.1.1 Manager outcomes
We start with the analysis of the no-message treatments. Since we are primarily interested in
learning how prediction markets can improve real decisions, the most important outcome measure
is whether managers make correct choices (CorrectDecision). Table 3 displays OLS estimates
(linear probability model) in column 3.10
With the action asset, manager decisions are 12.1 percentage points less likely to be correct,
compared to the deadline asset design. This is a statistically significant difference, and of large
magnitude. Given a base rate of 66.2% correct decisions with the deadline asset, managers barely
perform better than 50%, which a coin flipping manager would achieve, or one who always assigns
additional resources independent of the state. This result is surprising, as it is a highly significant
result in the opposite direction of what the theory predicts. Despite the action asset having a fully
revealing equilibrium, which would allow managers to achieve 100% correct decisions, managers
actually perform worse compared to the deadline asset where no fully revealing equilibrium exists.
Since we also elicited manager beliefs about the state, we can dig deeper and analyze whether
the worse manager performance is due to worse decisions or due to less information from the
prediction market.11 Recall that we elicited how likely managers think the good state is given the
10All results and significance levels for the binary outcome variables are the same when using logit regression
instead.
11In appendix B.3, we analyse the degree to which the elicited beliefs are consistent with actions.
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Table 3: No-message treatments: Manager outcomes
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) OLS
Dependent variable CorrectBelief CorrectBelief CorrectDecision CorrectDecision ManagerPayoff
Sample AN & DN AN & DN AN & DN AN & DN AN & DN
ActionAsset -0.112*** -0.017 -0.121** 0.061 -4.625***
(0.038) (0.045) (0.050) (0.105) (1.665)
Round 0.022*** 0.038***
(0.006) (0.012)
ActionAsset × Round -0.017** -0.033**
(0.008) (0.015)
Constant 0.631*** 0.510*** 0.662*** 0.456*** 61.875***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.043) (0.080) (1.462)
R2 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.01
Observations 480 480 480 480 480
Clusters 48 48 48 48 48
Note: CorrectBelief ∈ [0, 1] is the probability put on the correct state of the project by the manager.
CorrectDecision ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy for the correct state-dependent manager decision. ManagerPayoff ∈ [30, 90] is
the payoff from the manager action. Each observation is one manager-round. All regressions use the observations
from the action and deadline asset treatments without CEO message. Standard errors are shown in brackets below
the point estimates, and are clustered on manager level. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level;
*significant at the 10% level.
prediction market prices they observed, which was incentivized, and leads to variable CorrectBelief
which states how much probability mass managers put on the correct state.
Column 1 in Table 3 displays the belief results. The direction of the treatment effect is the
same as for manager decisions, and the magnitude is very similar. Managers in markets with
the action asset put 11.2 percentage points less on the correct state of the project. This is very
clear and direct evidence that the prediction market with the action asset does not reveal as much
information about the state of the project, compared to the deadline asset. Indeed, similar to the
decisions, managers put barely more than 50% on the correct state, compared to 63.1% in markets
with the deadline asset. Thus, it is not that managers with the action asset make systematically
worse decisions while having the same information. The problem is that the prediction market
with the action asset does not provide as much information about the state.
In column 5 of Table 3, we also analyze the manager action payoff, which is 90 if the deadline is
reached without additional resources, 60 if the deadline is reached with additional resources, and
30 if the deadline is not reached. The manager payoff is a measure of the value or welfare that
is created by the manager decision (which in turn depends on the market information). In line
with the two other manager outcome measures, outcomes are significantly worse with the action
asset.12 In other words, we find significant evidence against Prediction 1 (i.e., the prediction of
better performance of the action asset). This is summarized by our first main result:
Result 1. Without messages, the action asset leads to worse outcomes. Markets with the action
12We also ran the regressions in Table 3 with our risk aversion measure as an additional regressor. However, this
variable neither had a significant effect nor did it significantly change the treatment dummy estimates. Hence, we
report the regressions without the variable.
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asset provide less information, lead to fewer correct manager decisions, and lead to lower manager
payoffs.
Since the prediction market and manager interaction is a complex one, it is worth looking
into potential learning effects. Perhaps the action asset performs better in the later rounds,
suggesting it might work better with experience. Columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 estimate a linear
trend over the 10 rounds of the experiment for manager beliefs and correct decisions. There is
a significant improvement over time for the deadline asset, with CorrectBelief increasing by 2.2
percentage points per round on average and correct manager decisions increasing by 3.8 percentage
points per round. However, as the ActionAsset × Round interaction shows, this learning effect is
significantly smaller with the action asset. Indeed, based on the estimated linear trends, there is
no significant improvement over time with the action asset.13 Thus, while the two asset designs
are not significantly different initially, the action asset falls behind over time.
Result 2. Without messages, there is significant improvement over time due to learning with the
deadline asset, but no significant improvement with the action asset.
4.1.2 Prediction market prices
We can formally analyze the prices we observe in the prediction market and see how they differ by
asset design. In particular, revealing or separating equilibria rely on the fact that the observable
actions—here, the prices that are determined by the worker trades—differ by state. Hence, we
can formally analyze the degree of separation of prices by state. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 do
exactly that.
For the deadline asset in column 1, the average transaction prices14 are about 9.5 percentage
points15 larger in the good state compared to the bad state. This difference is statistically signif-
icant, so we have clear separation of prices by state. For the action asset in column 2, we do not
observe significant separation: Average transaction prices are the same in both states. And if we
include group fixed effects to account for the fact that the state-price mapping might be different
in different groups (not displayed), then these conclusions follow as well. Hence, it is clearly visible
in the raw price data that there is more separation with the deadline asset, and so it is no surprise
that managers learn more from the prices of the deadline asset. Appendix B.2 confirms this finding
when using transaction prices rather than mean prices as signals of the state.16
In column 3-4, we also tested whether transaction volume differs by state in any of the market
designs. Since managers see all transaction prices, they also see the trading volume. Hence, if
volume differs by state, then it could reveal information even if mean prices do not. We find
13Recall that the action asset design features multiple equilibria, one of which is uninformative. The hope is
that experience leads to convergence towards the revealing equilibrium. However, there is a body of experimental
literature that underscores the important role of path-dependence on equilibrium selection and casts doubt on
whether repetition alone can lead to improved outcomes. For example, Weber (2006) and Romero (2015) show that
a change of game parameters is needed to move groups from a “bad” equilibrium to a “good” equilibrium.
14Recall that managers observe all transaction prices, and get a summary of transaction prices after trading which
includes the average transaction price.
15Since prices are scaled to be between 0 and 1, we can interpret differences as percentage points.
16Moreover, all of our findings based on average prices are exactly the same if, instead, we use the last transaction
price, the average of the last three transaction prices, or the average of the last five transaction prices as alternative
price measures. This is important because the last transaction prices are often found to be more informative than
early transaction prices (e.g., Page and Siemroth, 2019).
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Table 4: No-message treatments: Market data
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) OLS
Dependent variable Prices Prices NumTrades NumTrades PriceSD
Sample DN AN DN AN AN & DN
GoodState 0.095** 0.002 -4.014 0.227
(0.041) (0.028) (2.651) (2.311)
ActionAsset -0.015
(0.011)
Constant 0.550*** 0.474*** 24.389*** 26.000*** 0.155***
(0.021) (0.017) (1.767) (1.230) (0.008)
R2 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02
Observations 1367 1565 60 60 120
Clusters 60 60
Note: Prices ∈ [0, 1] are the prices of executed trades in the market. NumTrades is the number of transactions in a
particular market (round). PriceSD is the standard deviation of transaction prices in a particular market (round).
Each observation is one trade (columns 1-2) or one market (column 3-5). Standard errors are shown in brackets
below the point estimates, and are clustered on market level. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5%
level; *significant at the 10% level.
that there is no significant difference in volume by state in either of the market designs. We can
therefore rule out that trading volume revealed more information in the action asset design; if
anything, trading volume also favors the deadline asset design, giving us a consistent picture why
manager decisions are better with the deadline asset.
Column 5 in Table 4 tests whether the standard deviation of prices in a market vary by
asset design, in a regression where data is aggregated at the market (round) level. We find no
significant difference. Hence, the difficulty in extracting information from prediction market prices
is not due to more noise or variance in one market design. Thus, we find significant evidence
against Prediction 2 (i.e., the prediction of larger variance of prices with the action asset). This is
summarized by the following result:
Result 3. Without messages, markets with the deadline asset have a significant difference in
transaction prices between the good and the bad states, i.e., prices reveal information about the
state. There is no significant difference in prices between states in markets with the action asset.
Moreover, there is no significant difference in the variance of prices between the two asset designs.
In order to illustrate the developments over time better, we graph the average transaction price
by state over the 10 rounds of the experiment, and the resulting probabilities that managers put
on the correct state over time, in Figure 2. The conclusions on treatment differences from the
regression tables, which pool all rounds, are consistent with these graphs.
First, in the top left, for the deadline asset treatment, the average transaction prices show
noticeable differences by state, i.e., prices in the good state tend to be larger from round 2 onwards,
and appear to increase in the later rounds. In contrast, the top right figure shows the average
transaction price by state for the action asset treatment, and these do not differ noticeably in
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Figure 2: Average transaction prices over time by state (top row), and correct manager beliefs over time
(bottom row)
decrease over time—this trend is present in both states, hence it does not make prices more or less
informative about the state over time.
Second, the bottom left graphs the probability that managers put on the correct state in
the deadline asset treatment. This correct belief tends to increase over time—in line with the
significantly positive time trend in the regression in Table 3—and in line with the separation in
prices displayed above. Hence, it is clearly visible that separating prices help managers infer the
underlying state of the project. In contrast, in the bottom right, the correct beliefs for managers
do have a clear linear trend over time in the action asset treatment, and the correct beliefs in the
last two rounds are not significantly different from the correct beliefs in the first round. And for
no round can we reject the hypothesis that beliefs are more than 50% correct in this treatment.
Our straightforward explanation is that prices are not an informative signal about the underlying
state in this treatment, hence managers cannot do better than random guessing.
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4.2 Explanation of behavior in the no-message treatments
4.2.1 What is to be explained
In the deadline asset treatments, prices are higher in the good state (on average 0.65) than in
the bad state (on average 0.55), which reveals some information about the state. Because of this,
manager decisions are significantly better than random guessing or probability matching the prior:
The correct state dependent decision is taken in 66% of cases. These outcomes are not equilibrium
outcomes.
In the action asset treatments, average prices are the same in both states (at about 0.48).
Thus, there is no separation and no information revelation, and manager decisions reflect this:
The correct state dependent decision is taken in 54% of cases, which is not statistically different
from random guessing (which would imply 50% correct decisions). These outcomes are equilibrium
outcomes in the mixed-strategy equilibrium where the manager assigns additional resources in 50%
of cases and workers trade at prices of p = 0.5.
Thus, our findings are not completely explained by the rational expectations model in section
2, as the deadline asset performance is better than what the theory predicts. We now provide an
explanation for these experimental findings based on incorrect expectations.17
4.2.2 A non-equilibrium explanation
Managers extract information from prices in the deadline asset treatments where we do observe
significantly different prices by state, and use that information to improve decisions above what
they could achieve by just using the prior distribution. Managers cannot extract information in the
action asset treatments, because prices do not reveal any (as mean prices do not differ by state).
Hence, the evidence supports the idea that managers are using the information contained in prices,
as would be expected in a rational expectations equilibrium. For an explanation we instead look
toward the workers who determine prices.
We need beliefs or a decision heuristic for the traders that explains revealing prices with one
asset but not the other, and also explains equilibrium outcomes with one asset but not the other.
Our goal is to find a parsimonious explanation, and it focuses on the beliefs of the workers.
Suppose workers believe that managers will randomly invest additional resources with 50%
probability, independently of what the workers themselves are doing (i.e., independent of prices).
Such beliefs are not consistent with our evidence, but could plausibly arise in at least two different
ways (though our explanation does not depend on how these beliefs arise).
First, such beliefs are predicted by level-k models from behavioral game theory. This class of
models relaxes the equilibrium assumption that players’ beliefs are consistent with other players’
actions. In particular, level-k models posit the existence of non-strategic L0 players (who ran-
domize uniformly across all available actions) and strategic Lk players, k = 1, 2, . . . ,∞ (who play
a best-response to the belief that all other players are Lk-1 ). The empirical content of level-k
models and the frequencies of various types can then be estimated using laboratory data. Broadly
17In the following section, we provide a behavioral explanation (based on incorrect worker beliefs) of our results.
However, we cannot directly test the assumptions of the underlying behavioral models with our experimental data.
Rather, we make the more limited claim that the predictions of the behavioral models are consistent with our results.
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speaking, experimental evidence suggests that the largest fraction of subjects are type L1.18 In
our setting, L1 workers would then play a best-response to the belief that managers are L0, i.e.,
to the belief that managers will invest with 50% probability.
Second, workers could believe that managers are “cursed” in the sense of Eyster et al. (2019).
Intuitively, cursed agents in financial markets either neglect or fail to fully take into account the
informational content of prices. In the extreme case where a manager makes no inference from
asset trading prices, she would instead rely on the prior distribution of states and hence may just
randomize in her resource decision. Thus, workers’ (mistaken) perception that they are interacting
with cursed managers could also generate the belief that managers will invest additional resources
with 50% probability.19
What outcomes would we observe if workers held such beliefs and best responded to them?
Given such beliefs, workers anticipate an expected asset value of 0.5 in the action asset treatments,
because the asset value is completely determined by the manager action, who according to their
beliefs is randomizing. The market clearing price given such beliefs is 0.5 in both states. This is
what we observe in the data.
The deadline asset is different because its value directly depends both on the manager action
and on the state. Specifically, if the state is good, then the asset value is 1 no matter the manager
decision. But if the state is bad, then the asset value is 1 only if the manager assigns additional
resources, and 0 otherwise. Thus, given the worker beliefs, their expected asset value is lower in
the bad state, because the asset pays off only if the manager assigns additional resources, which
they believe she does in 50% of the cases. Consequently, the market clearing price in the bad state
is 0.5, which is what we observe (the mean price is 0.55), and higher in the good state, which we
also observe.
Thus, our incorrect expectations account of worker behavior can explain the observed mean
prices in both states in the action asset treatments exactly, and the mean prices in the bad state
in the deadline asset treatment exactly. It also explains why there is separation with one asset
but not the other, and by extension, non-equilibrium outcomes with one asset but not the other.
However, it does not explain the exact price level in the good state in the deadline asset treatment:
Workers should be trading at a price of 1 whereas they trade at an average price of 0.65. Thus,
our explanation accurately explains average prices in three out of four state-treatment cells, and
all qualitative state-differences by treatment.20
Why do these incorrect expectations among workers lead to an equilibrium outcome in the
action asset treatment but not in the deadline asset treatment? The reason is that these beliefs
are self-fulfilling and thus correct in the former, but not the latter. In the action asset treatment,
if workers believe the manager to randomize no matter what they do, then they should only be
18For instance, the seminal paper of Nagel (1995) on the “p-beauty contest” game estimates the respective fractions
of L0, L1, L2, and L3 types in the data to be 0.13, 0.44, 0.39, and 0.03 for p = 2
3
.
19While the belief of cursed managers is incorrect in our experiment, there is ample evidence in behavioral eco-
nomics supporting the notion that agents “underinfer” information from other people’s actions (see, e.g., section IV
in Eyster et al., 2019 for an overview or Corgnet et al., 2015 for an example in a market setting.). Hence, such a
belief is not unreasonable in general.
20A complete explanation that can match the mean price in the fourth state-treatment cell as well would require
some form of non-best response behavior. Since our goal was to provide a parsimonious explanation, we focused
on an incorrect-belief based theory that can explain all of the qualitative results and most the quantitative results
(price levels).
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trading at prices of 0.5 in both states. If they do that, then prices do not reveal anything about
the state and the manager can indeed rationally randomize (i.e., mix her strategies). Thus, these
myopic beliefs can lead to a non-revealing equilibrium outcome, though clearly not to the also
existing fully revealing equilibrium, which would require a belief that managers actually react to
the information contained in prices.
Our explanation suggests a remedy for this problem. If traders incorrectly believe that man-
agers do not react to prices, then it should be possible to correct the trader beliefs by providing an
example of a revealing trading strategy as well as the appropriate manager reaction. If this is done
publicly, such that the information is common knowledge among all participants, then traders will
know that managers know a strategy profile where the manager reacts to prices. In the following
treatments, our CEO message provides such a public announcement.
4.3 CEO message treatments
We now analyze the CEO message treatments. The CEO message explains the general idea behind
the prediction market (i.e., to reveal worker information to managers for better decisions) and
provides an example of a fully revealing trading strategy. While the basic structure of the CEO
message is identical for both asset market designs, the details of the described trading strategies
differ.21 For the action asset, the CEO message describes a fully revealing trading strategy that
implements the fully revealing equilibrium. For the deadline asset, the CEO message describes a
fully revealing trading strategy that is not consistent with any equilibrium. Neither of the two
CEO messages claim that the described strategies are optimal, nor do they explicitly recommend
the use of these strategies. Rather, the CEO messages are framed as the “vision” of the CEO for
how the prediction markets can plausibly operate. It is emphasized that subjects are free to trade
in any fashion.
The inferiority of the action asset in the no-message treatments may have at least two different
causes. First, the equilibrium may have been too complex for subjects to identify on their own
through introspection. Second, subjects may not have been able to coordinate on the fully revealing
equilibrium.22 The CEO message can potentially mitigate both of these problems. First, it raises
awareness of a trading strategy that workers may not have noticed (which is part of an equilibrium
for the action asset). Second, because it is a public message, it facilitates coordination of the
financial market and it helps to establish a possible mapping from states to prices. This latter
point is important for managers to be able to infer the state from observed prices.
4.3.1 Manager Outcomes
Columns 1-3 in Table 5 show the same manager outcomes for the CEO message treatments that
we analyzed for the no-message treatments before. On all three outcome measures, there is no
significant difference between markets using the action and deadline assets. Furthermore, the point
estimates of the difference are also relatively small. A notable exception (in terms of magnitude)
21The CEO messages for both the deadline asset and the action asset are provided in the appendix.
22Since the corporate prediction market is a “market signalling game,” and given the approximately competitive
nature of the market, a single worker cannot change market prices significantly to change the signal sent to managers.
Hence, even if individual workers understood there was a fully revealing equilibrium, this may not have been enough
to steer the entire market there.
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is the share of correct manager decisions, which is 9.2 percentage points larger with the action
asset. This estimate, while not significantly different from zero, is an indicator of the potential of
the action asset.
Overall, while the CEO message does not make the action asset perform better as predicted
by theory, it does remove the negative difference found in the no-message treatments. And while
there is significant learning over the 10 rounds of the experiment, such that manager decisions are
better in later rounds, we found no significantly different learning between the two asset designs
(learning regressions are not displayed).
Result 4. In the CEO message treatments, there is no significant difference in outcomes or learn-
ing between the action and deadline assets.
Columns 6-7 in Table 5 compare action asset markets with and without the CEO message. The
CEO message significantly improves outcomes across all measures. This difference is also large in
magnitude: It improves correct decisions from barely better than a coin flip to about 79% correct
decisions. Columns 4-5 show that the CEO message also significantly improves manager beliefs in
the deadline asset markets, whereas the share of correct decisions has a positive but insignificant
point estimate. Overall, the magnitudes of improvement are lower for the deadline asset since it
started from a higher base rate in the no-message treatments. In other words, we find significant
evidence in favor of Prediction 3 (i.e., the prediction that the CEO message improves manager
decisions for the action asset but not for the deadline asset). This is summarized by the following
result:
Result 5. The CEO message improves outcomes for markets with the action asset. It also improves






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: CEO message treatments: Market prices
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS
Dependent variable Prices Prices Prices Prices
Sample DC AC DN & DC AN & AC
GoodState 0.314*** -0.346*** 0.095** 0.002
(0.044) (0.040) (0.041) (0.028)
CEOMessage -0.028 0.175***
(0.045) (0.036)
CEOMessage × GoodState 0.219*** -0.349***
(0.060) (0.049)
Constant 0.522*** 0.650*** 0.550*** 0.474***
(0.040) (0.032) (0.021) (0.017)
R2 0.36 0.34 0.24 0.25
Observations 1179 1567 2546 3132
Clusters 60 60 120 120
Note: Prices ∈ [0, 1] are the prices of executed trades in the market. Each observation is one trade. Regressions use
the observations from the action asset treatments with CEO message (col 1), from the deadline asset treatments
with CEO message (col 2), from deadline asset treatments with and without message (col 3) and from action asset
treatments with and without message (col 4). Standard errors are shown in brackets below the point estimates, and
are clustered on market level. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10%
level.
Our treatments can at least partially pin down the underlying mechanism for why the CEO
message improves outcomes. In particular, we are able to distinguish between two possible chan-
nels. First, if subjects respond to advice per se, then the CEO message will be effective in both
market designs by inducing an experimenter demand effect. Second, if subjects only respond to
self-enforcing advice, then the CEO message will be effective only in the action asset market where
the described trading strategies are consistent with equilibrium behavior. Our finding that the
CEO message improves manager decisions in the action asset, but not the deadline asset, casts
doubt on the experimenter demand hypothesis and provides support for the equilibrium hypothesis.
4.3.2 Prediction market prices
Again, we can analyze the effect of the CEO message on prices, and how the message interacts with
the different asset designs. Table 6 tests whether there is price separation in the CEO message
treatments in columns 1 and 2. For the deadline asset, prices differ significantly between state
by on average 31 percentage points. For the action asset, there is separation by on average 35
percentage points, and prices in the good state are lower, exactly as suggested in the CEO message
that described the fully revealing equilibrium.23
Columns 3 and 4 estimate the effect of the CEO message on state-price differences directly, as
captured by the interaction term. For the deadline asset, the difference in average prices between
the good and the bad states increases significantly due to the CEO message, i.e., separation
increases. For the action asset, the difference between the good and the bad states significantly
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Figure 3: Calibration of prediction market prices, by treatment
decreases. Since that difference was virtually zero without the message, separation (as the absolute
value of the difference between states) also significantly increases. Thus, the CEO message causes
significant changes in market behavior for both assets. In particular, it increases price separation
and thereby makes prices more informative and more revealing about the underlying state.
Result 6. With the CEO message, markets with the deadline and action assets have a significant
difference in transaction prices between the good and the bad states, i.e., prices reveal information
about the state. There is significantly more information revelation for both assets due to the CEO
message.
4.3.3 Calibration and mis-pricing
Since prediction market prices are usually interpreted as probability forecasts, it is useful to check
for calibration of these prices. Formally, calibration requires prices to fulfill p = E[v|p], where v
is the asset payoff. For example, calibration requires that for asset prices of 0.2, the asset does
indeed pay off in 20% of the cases; for asset prices of 0.3, the asset pays off in 30% of the cases,
and so on. Hence, calibration is a mild form of absence of mis-pricing, which is closely related to
weak-form informational efficiency.
In standard prediction market settings with exogenous asset values but asymmetric information
among traders about those values, market prices are typically found to be well calibrated (e.g.,
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Table 7: Mispricing
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS
Dependent variable Price Error Price Error Price Error Price Error
Sample AN & DN AC & DC DN & DC AN & AC
ActionAsset -0.189*** -0.170***
(0.045) (0.052)
CEO Message 0.007 0.026
(0.045) (0.051)
Constant 0.768*** 0.775*** 0.768*** 0.579***
(0.036) (0.027) (0.036) (0.027)
R2 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00
Observations 11728 10984 10184 12528
Clusters 120 120 120 120
Note: Price Error ∈ [0, 1] is the absolute difference between the ex post asset value (determined by state and manager
action) and the transaction price, |a(θ, d)− p|. Each observation is one trade. Standard errors are shown in brackets
below the point estimates, and are clustered on market level. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5%
level; *significant at the 10% level.
Page and Clemen, 2013 in the field for short maturities; Dreber et al., 2015 in the field; Page
and Siemroth, 2017 in the lab). In our setting, where we investigate prediction markets with
endogenous asset values, it is clear that prices are not well calibrated.
The calibration plots, which compare all possible prices on the x-axis and the associated ex-
pected asset values given these prices on the y-axis, are displayed in Figure 3.24 We use transaction-
level prices in this analysis, with standard errors clustered at market level.
According to Figure 3, the calibration curve is almost flat, especially in the no-message treat-
ments. By contrast, perfect calibration would require the curve to be on the 45 degree line, so that
conditional expected asset values match prices. The CEO message improves calibration, especially
for the action asset. Indeed, the action asset with CEO message produces the best calibration,
although even here the calibration curve significantly differs from the 45 degree line for most prices.
This is further evidence that endogenous asset values are challenging for subjects and markets,
and simple forms of mis-pricing can arise.
To formally test whether there are differences in mis-pricing by treatment, we can compute
the absolute difference between the price and the ex post asset value (zero or one) for each trans-
action.25 We refer to this mis-pricing measure as “price error.” Treatments where prices always
equal asset values would have a price error of zero. Treatments where prices on average differ more
from asset values would have larger price errors.
Table 7 shows that markets with the action asset have significantly smaller price errors, and
the CEO message does not significantly reduce price errors. In particular, the action asset has
19 percentage points smaller price errors in the no-message treatments and 17 percentage points
smaller price errors in the CEO message treatments. This means that workers tend to trade
24We excluded prices of 0 from the analysis, as some treatments had no transactions at a price of 0, and those
that had featured very low numbers.
25Our conclusions are unchanged if we use squared rather than absolute differences.
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more at prices that diverge from the actual asset values in the deadline asset markets, so that the
losses of those on the wrong end of the transaction are larger. For example, if the asset value is
a(θ, d) = 1, then the seller at a price p < 1 makes a loss, while the buyer makes a profit, and the
losses and profits increase with the difference between price and asset value, overall having a zero
sum. In this sense, mis-pricing is closely linked to non-best responses (the seller had better not
traded, or traded at a higher price), and could be viewed as a measure of regret for one party in
the transaction. We would then expect a market design with lower mis-pricing to be more stable
in the long term and in the field, just as we typically expect equilibrium behavior (which implies
a price error of zero) to be more stable.
Result 7. Markets with the action asset are better calibrated and exhibit less mis-pricing. The
CEO message does not significantly change mis-pricing.
This result is perhaps the strongest one in favour of the action asset design. And given no
significant differences between manager decision quality, we could use mis-pricing as a secondary
criterion to argue that—if supported by something similar to a CEO message—the action as-
set market design may be preferable, because some workers lose less money by revealing their
information.
As a final point, appendix B.1 analyses the effects of asset design and CEO message on trade
volume. More trading indicates higher liquidity and makes participation in these markets more
attractive; a lack of liquidity is viewed as a major threat to the proper functioning of double auction
prediction markets (e.g., Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006). The regressions show that the action asset
increases trading volume relative to the deadline asset, while the CEO message has no significant
effect.
5 Discussion
Our results have two important implications: one for practitioners planning to use corporate pre-
diction markets to improve decision making, and another for researchers planning to run laboratory
experiments to inform practitioners.
First, even if the market/asset is properly designed so that a desirable (i.e., revealing) equi-
librium exists, our results suggest that the interaction between the prediction market and the
manager’s decision is perhaps too complex for users to arrive at the desirable equilibrium them-
selves. To alleviate this problem, firms planning to use corporate prediction markets should clearly
communicate their objectives to their employees. Our CEO message implemented this top-down
advice in a simple way, and the change significantly improved outcomes.
Second, our no-message treatments are conducted in line with the standard practices of ex-
perimental economics. That is, the instructions provided to subjects explain the setup, strategy
spaces, and payoffs with a neutral framing and with an eye toward mitigating experimenter de-
mand effects. Clearly, subjects failed to reach the fully revealing equilibrium in the action asset
treatment and the unique non-revealing equilibrium in the deadline asset treatment. This was
true even in the later rounds of the experiment, so there was no obvious pattern of learning or
convergence towards the desirable equilibrium.
These findings provide valuable insights for theory. However, the no-message treatments may
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not be the ideal setup for generating robust and portable results that can carry over to the field. In
particular, a company running a corporate prediction market will typically communicate with their
employees and try to steer them towards better outcomes, perhaps even providing explicit advice
like in our CEO message. Standard game-theoretic experiments (like our no-message treatments),
on the other hand, are deliberately non-leading in their design in order to allow the experimenter
to observe how subjects behave in strategic settings without guidance.
Thus, we argue that the CEO message treatments provide the superior test of how these
markets are likely to perform outside the lab. In other words, we view the message treatments as
a “policy” experiment, which tells us something about the optimal design of corporate prediction
markets, while we view the no-message treatments as a “theory-testing” experiment, which tells
us something about strategic reasoning and behavior in a more stylized setting. Indeed, these
different justifications for conducting laboratory studies have been identified much earlier in the
history of experimental economics. In the framework of Roth (1986), the message treatments
advance the goal of “whispering in the ears of princes” while the no-message treatments advance
the goal of “speaking to theorists.”
Similar arguments have been raised by Zizzo (2010), who points out that advice can be useful
in improving the external validity of experimental results if that same advice would also have been
provided in the real world setting that the experimenter wishes to mimic. Zizzo (2010) further
notes that advice can be important if it is the primary object of research, i.e., if the researcher
explicitly wishes to identify the effects of advice on behavior and outcomes. There is also a
growing experimental literature that investigates the impact of advice to participants in strategy-
proof matching mechanisms (e.g. Guillen and Hing, 2014; Guillen and Hakimov, 2018; Ding and
Schotter, 2019). These studies are “motivated by the idea that economic mechanisms should be
tested in the environments in which they are used in the real world” (Ding and Schotter, 2019).
Our experiment continues in this tradition. Our results suggest that organizations with corporate
prediction markets should be transparent in communicating to their users how they intend these
markets to function.
In practical applications in the field, there may be additional challenges that we carefully
controlled for in the lab. First, the state of the project was exogenous here, but in many cases the
workers directly influence that state (e.g., by putting in more effort). In the worst case, this might
induce additional incentives for workers to derail the project in order to make money by betting on
a missed deadline. One theoretical study considers this problem (Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2007),
but empirical evidence is scarce. In the best case, it might induce additional incentives to work
harder on the project. Second, there could be complications if the managers are allowed to trade in
the prediction markets, unlike in our setting. Since manager decisions have a direct impact on the
asset value—indeed, in the action asset design their action solely determines the asset value—this
could induce incentives for managers to change their decisions for higher trading profit. Third,
workers in companies might be afraid of getting fired if news of problems with their project gets
out, which might induce additional incentives to keep bad news under wraps. This might make
these markets less effective than they are in our lab setting where we removed the threat of being
fired. Overall, our lab study focused on the problem of information transmission from workers to
decision makers via corporate prediction markets if decisions feed back to asset values. To cleanly
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investigate the different designs, we deliberately shut off the potential complications just discussed,
which should however be taken into account in field applications.
We would also like to discuss the use of belief elicitation in our experiment. While beliefs often
play a role in economic models, they are not directly observed and so economists have developed
incentivized procedures to elicit true beliefs. The effectiveness of these procedures at eliciting true
beliefs is still an open question, with possible belief distortion arising from multiple sources. First,
there is a concern that the act of belief elicitation itself alters beliefs compared to the beliefs that
subjects would hold in the absence of belief elicitation. Second, there is experimental evidence
that subjects may exhibit over-confidence and inflate their beliefs about their own abilities or
other ego-relevant characteristics (Burks et al., 2013; Charness et al., 2018). Third, depending on
the particular procedure that is used, risk-averse subjects may have incentives to misreport their
beliefs in a direction that is closer to a uniform prior (Offerman et al., 2009). Fourth, the problem
of hedging can arise if subjects are paid based on both their actions and their reported beliefs
(Blanco et al., 2010). Finally, the size of financial incentives can affect the accuracy of reported
beliefs (Coutts, 2019; Zimmermann, 2020). Despite these concerns, Schotter and Trevino (2014)
argue that the practice of eliciting incentivized beliefs in the lab generates accurate and meaningful
data, as measured by the consistency between subjects’ actions and their reported beliefs.
Although our main outcome variable of interest is the manager’s decision, we use the quadratic
scoring rule to elicit the manager’s belief about the state of the project (which is incentive-
compatible under the assumption of risk-neutrality). We argue that our elicited belief data is
reliable for several reasons. First, we elicit beliefs about the realization of a binary random vari-
able that is not ego-relevant. Second, subjects are provided detailed guidance about the belief
elicitation procedure in the experimental instructions, which includes both a statement that re-
porting their true beliefs maximizes their expected earnings as well as example calculations to
illustrate that point. Third, there is no opportunity for hedging in our experiment since the man-
ager is randomly paid based on only one of her two tasks: either the accuracy of her reported
belief or her investment decision. Finally, we find that 86% of managers’ investment decisions are
a best-response to their reported beliefs about the state of the project, which compares favorably
to estimates from previous experimental studies.26
6 Concluding remarks
We consider a setting where a manager needs information that workers have in order to make a
correct state-dependent decision about whether to invest additional resources into a project facing
a deadline. Corporate prediction markets are one possible mechanism that can potentially reveal
this information to managers. In a laboratory experiment, we test two different prediction market
designs that may help in the managerial decision making process. Markets with the deadline asset
let workers predict whether the deadline of a project will be met. This design has previously been
used in the field. Markets with the action asset let workers predict whether additional resources
will be assigned by the manager. Standard theory shows that the action asset provides superior
incentives for workers/traders to reveal their information, whereas there is no revealing equilibrium
with the deadline asset.
26For more details, see Appendix B.3.
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The results from our no-message treatments, however, show that the theoretically inferior
deadline asset does better than the action asset in the lab, as measured by correct state-dependent
manager decisions. This result is surprising, and suggests that the complex nature of the interaction
between the prediction market and the manager’s decision is not entirely understood by all workers.
Our behavioral explanation of the observed outcomes is consistent with workers/traders having
incorrect beliefs about how managers react to the market. Hence, subjects fail to reach the desirable
revealing equilibrium in the action asset markets, which requires traders to understand that their
trades affect manager decisions.
We also run two additional treatments where both workers and managers receive a fictitious
CEO message that describes the purpose of the prediction markets, and provides an example
of a revealing trading strategy. With this additional message, the information revealed by the
prediction market and the share of correct manager decisions increase considerably in the action
asset design and, to a lesser extent, in the deadline asset design. These results suggest that firms
running corporate prediction markets should describe how these markets are used for decision
making, and how they are supposed to work. Not only does this help traders understand how
information can be transmitted via the market, it can also help mediate equilibrium selection in
the action asset markets. When comparing both market designs with the CEO message, the action
asset design has lower mis-pricing, which suggests it could be more stable in the long run.
From here, there are several promising avenues for future research. An important next step
is to test these market designs in the field, and over the long run. An intriguing result from our
experiment is that a CEO message describing a revealing equilibrium trading strategy (action
asset) produces similarly good manager decisions as a CEO message describing a revealing non-
equilibrium trading strategy (deadline asset). This parity might change in the field in the long run,
especially once traders recognize that they regularly lose money in the deadline asset markets when
revealing their information. Another salient question is whether a corporate prediction market is
actually the best mechanism for this task. While we compared outcomes under different prediction
market designs in this study, mechanism design might suggest a different optimal mechanism
altogether depending on the specifics of the problem. Future work might therefore compare the
performance of different mechanisms along the lines of Healy et al. (2010).
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
i. Suppose there exists a fully revealing equilibrium with p(θ = 1) 6= p(θ = 0). Then the manager
infers the realization of θ and optimally selects d(θ = 1) = 0 and d(θ = 0) = 1, so the deadline
is always fulfilled, and the asset value is 1 in every state. Clearly, we must have p(θ = 1) = 1
in any equilibrium as the asset value is 1 independent of the manager decision. And since
the asset value is 1 in every state, we also must have p(θ = 0) = 1, otherwise traders choose
xi = w/p > 0 for all i if θ = 0, and markets do not clear. But this contradicts our earlier
assumption that a fully revealing equilibrium exists.
ii. Let us conjecture that a non-revealing equilibrium exists, so the manager does not receive
any information from market prices, i.e., p(θ = 0) = p(θ = 1). Hence, the manager assigns
additional resources based on her prior beliefs, so that d = 1 is optimal if
bm − c ≥ 0.5bm ⇐⇒ bm/2 ≥ c.
Because this decision is based on her prior beliefs, d = 1 is state independent if bm/2 ≥ c.
Consequently, even in the bad state the deadline is reached, because additional resources are
always assigned. Thus, the asset value is always 1 and p(θ) = 1 clears the market in all states.
Any market clearing demand-function strategy profile (e.g., xi = 0 ∀i) therefore constitutes a
non-revealing equilibrium.
If bm/2 < c, then d = 0 is optimal, so the deadline is met if θ = 1 but not if θ = 0. Knowing
θ, traders do not clear the market for any price function p(θ = 0) = p(θ = 1), as this implies
a(θ, d = 0) 6= p(θ) for at least one state. Hence, a non-revealing equilibrium only exists if
bm/2 ≥ c.
Proof of Proposition 2.
i. Consider the equilibrium candidate p(θ = 1) = 0 and p(θ = 0) = 1. This is a fully revealing
price function, hence the manager optimally chooses d = 1 if θ = 0 and d = 0 if θ = 1. Since
the action asset value is a(θ, d) = d, the asset values match the prices in this equilibrium
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candidate in every state. Thus, any demand-function strategy profile that clears the market
with this price function is a fully revealing equilibrium.
ii. Let us conjecture that a non-revealing equilibrium exists, so the manager does not receive
any information from market prices, i.e., p(θ = 0) = p(θ = 1). Hence, the manager assigns
additional resources based on her prior beliefs, so that d = 1 is optimal if
bm − c ≥ bm/2 ⇐⇒ bm/2 ≥ c.
Because this decision is based on her prior beliefs, d = 1 is state independent. Consequently,
p(θ) = 1 is a non-revealing equilibrium, because asset values are 1 in every state, and so are
prices, hence there exist investment strategy profiles that clear the market with p = 1.
If, on the other hand, bm/2 < c, then d = 0 is optimal. Again, because this decision is based
on her prior beliefs, d = 0 is state independent. Consequently, p(θ) = 0 is a non-revealing
equilibrium, because asset values are 0 in every state, and so are prices.
iii. Since bm/2 = c, the manager is indifferent between assigning additional resources or not based
on the prior distribution. Hence, for any state-independent price function p(θ) = α with
α ∈ [0, 1], the manager receives no additional information from prices and may optimally
assign additional resources with any probability. For market clearing, the expected asset value
has to equal the price given the state. Hence, if p(θ) = α, then the manager must assign
additional resources with probability α, so that Ed[a(θ, d)|θ] = α1 + (1− α)0 = α.
There are no mixed strategy equilibria for bm/2 6= c, because then the manager is not indiffer-
ent between additional resources or not based only on the prior probability distribution.
B Additional results and robustness checks
B.1 Volume
Table 8 shows the impact of asset design and CEO message on trading volume, as measured by
the number of trades per round. The action asset significantly increases trade over the deadline
asset, while the CEO message has no significant impact on trading volume.
B.2 Robustness: Revelation of information by prices
In the main section we formally test whether prices are revealing by testing whether mean trans-
action prices are significantly different by state in a treatment. If they are, then the mean price
is a predictor of the state of the project. The main section focuses on mean prices because it is
given as a summary to managers after every trading window, and it also summarizes the observed
transaction prices well.
For robustness, we can ask if not only the mean, but also the individual transaction prices reveal
information. For this purpose, we can compute the probability of a good state of the project given
an observed transaction price p, Pr(θ = 1|p). If a treatment has some prices with a high conditional
probability, indicating a good state, and other prices with a low probability, indicating a bad state,
then transaction prices would be statistically informative about the underlying state.
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Table 8: Effect of asset design and CEO message on trading volume
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS





ActionAsset × CEOMessage 2.775
(3.649)
Constant 21.929*** 24.850*** 22.400***
(1.255) (1.252) (1.824)
R2 0.08 0.00 0.09
Observations 140 140 140
Note: NumTrades is the number of executed trades in the double auction market. Each observation is one mar-
ket (round). Standard errors are shown in brackets below the point estimates, and are heteroskedasticity-robust.
***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.
The conditional probabilities are displayed in Figure 4. In the no-message treatments, the
action asset transaction prices are very uninformative. For the transaction prices, the associated
conditional probabilities of a good state are almost flat, so that for example observing a low price
of p = 0.3 has the same probability of a good state as a high price of p = 0.9. This result mirrors
our conclusion from the main section that mean prices are not informative.
The deadline asset without message does better here; the transaction prices tend to be infor-
mative. In particular, high prices are associated with a higher probability of a good state. While
the relationship is not monotone, the results from the main section—especially the manager beliefs
and actions—clearly show that these prices are revealing and managers are able to make the right
inferences.
In the CEO message treatments, transaction prices for both assets are clearly more informative.
Consistent with the respective CEO messages, higher prices indicate the good state in the deadline
asset treatment and the bad state in the action asset treatment. Again, this mirrors our conclusion
from the main section that mean prices are revealing. Hence, looking at mean or transaction prices
yields very similar conclusions as to whether information is revealed by prices in a treatment.
B.3 Robustness: Consistency of manager beliefs and actions
In all of our treatments, we elicit the probability belief of managers that the state of the project
is good after they observed the market, which potentially revealed information about the state.
This elicitation was incentivized and the variable BeliefGoodState stores this probability belief.
To check whether manager actions—their decision to invest additional resources (Additional-
Resources=1) or not—and their beliefs are consistent, we assume that managers are either risk
neutral or risk averse, but not risk seeking. We can then determine the subjective probability of
the good state at which a rational risk neutral manager would be indifferent between investing
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Figure 4: Probability of a good state given a specific transaction price, by treatment
deadline of 60, and a cost of additional resources of 30 (independent of treatment), this indifference
probability p is
60 = 90p+ 30(1− p) ⇐⇒ p = 1/2,
that is, a risk neutral manager with BeliefGoodState=1/2 is indifferent between assigning addi-
tional resources or not, and strictly prefers additional resources if BeliefGoodState < 1/2. Risk
averse managers in this case also strictly prefer additional resources. Thus, in Table 9 we ana-
lyze the additional resource decision in all cases where managers stated BeliefGoodState < 1/2.
We should observe 100% decisions to assign additional resources if managers are rational and
not risk seeking. The constant in column 1 shows that 86% of decisions are consistent with be-
liefs. Although we can reject the hypothesis that this fraction equals 100%, our best-response rate
compares favorably with previous experimental work. For example, in the context of two-player
normal-form games, Rey-Biel (2009) find that only 67% of subjects’ actions are a best-response to
their stated beliefs. Columns 2-4 show that the inconsistency does not vary by treatment, hence
systematic differences in manager consistency do not explain treatment differences.
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Table 9: Robustness: Consistency of manager beliefs and actions
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS
Dependent var. AdditionalResources AdditionalResources AdditionalResources AdditionalResources





Constant 0.861*** 0.863*** 0.842*** 0.846***
(0.031) (0.050) (0.047) (0.055)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 388 388 388 388
Clusters 91 91 91 91
Note: AdditionalResources ∈ {0, 1} is the decision whether a manager invests additional resources.
BeliefGoodState ∈ [0, 1] is the probability put on the good state after observing market prices in our incentivized
belief elicitation. The sample in these regressions are all decisions where the manager stated BeliefGoodState<0.5.
Each observation is one manager-round. Standard errors are shown in brackets below the point estimates, and are
clustered on manager level. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10%
level.
B.4 Robustness: Results only in the last half of the rounds
In this section, we rerun the main analyses from the main section, but not based on data from
all 10 rounds of the experiment, but only based on the last 5 rounds of the experiment to see
whether learning makes a difference. Table 10 does this with the manager outcomes in the no-
message treatments. Comparing to the results from the full sample (see Table 3), the results are
qualitatively identical, i.e., all treatment effects are significantly different from zero in the same
direction. The magnitudes differ slightly, with differences in correct beliefs and correct decisions
even larger in the last 5 rounds, while the difference in payoffs is slightly smaller.
Similarly, Table 11 runs the same regressions as Table 5, but only using the last 5 rounds.
The sign of the point estimates are the same for all 7 regressions; the significance levels are the
same for 6 out of 7 regressions. Only the effect of the CEO message on correct beliefs in the
deadline asset treatments becomes weaker in the last 5 rounds, compared to the full 10 rounds.
This is consistent with the effect of the CEO message on correct decisions in the deadline asset
treatments, which is not statistically different from zero (either in the full 10 periods or the last 5).
In both samples, the effect of the CEO message on both correct beliefs and decisions is significantly
positive in the action asset treatments. Overall, this delivers a consistent picture of the effects of
the CEO message: It works in the action asset treatments, but not or less so in the deadline asset
treatments, which already work well without the CEO message.
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Table 10: No-message treatments: Manager outcomes, last 5 rounds
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS
Dependent variable CorrectBelief CorrectDecision ManagerPayoff
ActionAsset -0.145*** -0.200*** -4.000*
(0.049) (0.064) (2.330)
Constant 0.670*** 0.733*** 62.000***
(0.043) (0.053) (2.077)
R2 0.06 0.04 0.01
Observations 240 240 240
Clusters 48 48 48
Note: CorrectBelief ∈ [0, 1] is the probability put on the correct state of the project by the manager.
CorrectDecision ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy for the correct state-dependent manager decision. ManagerPayoff ∈ [30, 90] is
the payoff from the manager action. Each observation is one manager-round. This table only uses the data from
the last 5 out of 10 rounds. Standard errors are shown in brackets below the point estimates, and are clustered on











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• Welcome to ESSEXLab and thank you for participating in today’s 
experiment. 
• Please place all of your personal belongings away so that we can 
have your complete attention.
• Please use the computer only as instructed. In particular, do not 
attempt to browse the web or use programs unrelated to the 
experiment.
Guidelines
• You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the 
experiment.
• The amount of money that you ultimately earn in the 
experiment depends on your decisions, the decisions of others, 
and random chance.  
• You have each earned a £5 payment for showing up on time.
• Please DO NOT socialize or talk during the experiment.
C Instructions for the deadline asset treatment
40
• The main part of the experiment consists of 11 rounds: a practice 
round and 10 actual rounds.
• We will also ask you to complete a short task at the end of the 
experiment.
• 1 of the 10 actual rounds will be randomly selected to determine 
your payment.
• Each round is equally likely to be selected.
• Thus, it is important for you to take each round seriously.
Structure of the Experiment
• During the experiment, we will use a hypothetical currency 
(“tokens”) to keep track of your earnings.
• At the end of the experiment, tokens will be converted into 
pounds using the following exchange rate: 6 tokens = £1.
Experimental Currency
• At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly 
assigned to a role and a group.
• Your role can be either a worker (2/3 chance) or a manager (1/3 
chance).
• Your group will consist of 12 subjects: 8 workers and 4 managers.
• Both your role and your group will remain fixed across all 10 
rounds of the experiment.
Overview
• In each round of the experiment, each group faces a project deadline.
• The feasibility of meeting the project deadline depends on the state of 
the project.
• The state of the project can be either “good” or “bad”.
• Both states are equally likely to occur.
• The workers, but not the managers, are informed of the state of 
the project.
Overview
• If the state of the project is good, then the project deadline is 
easier to meet.
• The project deadline will always be met, regardless of whether the 
manager decides to invest additional resources into the project.
Good State
• If the state of the project is bad, then the project deadline is harder 
to meet.
• The project deadline will only be met if the manager decides to 
invest additional resources into the project.
Bad State
• Before the manager decides whether to invest additional resources 
into the project, the workers participate in a financial market.
• Each worker starts with a token endowment of 40 tokens and an 
asset endowment of 4 units.
• The asset pays out depending on whether the project deadline is met.
– If the project deadline is met, each unit of the asset pays 10 
tokens.
– If the project deadline is not met, each unit of the asset pays 0 
tokens.
Financial Market
• Workers can buy or sell units of the asset in the financial market.
• Once a worker makes an offer to either buy or sell the asset, any 
other worker is free to accept the offer.
• If an offer is accepted, the buyer gains one unit of the asset and 
incurs the stated price while the seller loses one unit of the asset 
and receives the stated price.
Financial Market
• Suppose a worker has a token endowment of 40 tokens and an 
asset endowment of 4 units.
• If the worker sells 1 unit of the asset at a price of 5 tokens, then 
her token holdings increase to 45 tokens and her asset holdings 
decrease to 3 units.
Example #1: Selling the Asset
• Suppose a worker has a token endowment of 40 tokens and an 
asset endowment of 4 units.
• If the worker buys 1 unit of the asset at a price of 5 tokens, then 
her token holdings decrease to 35 tokens and her asset holdings 
increase to 5 units.
Example #2: Buying the Asset
• Workers are allowed to sell all 4 units of the asset.  In this case, they 
will only hold tokens.
• Workers are allowed to spend all their tokens to purchase additional 
units of the asset.  In this case, they will only hold assets.
• The managers are able to observe all trading in the financial market.
• The financial market closes after 2 minutes.
Financial Market
Financial Market for Workers
This column shows all prices at which trades 
have been made (only one trade so far)
This column shows all prices at which you can 
buy an asset. Select a price and click “Buy”
This column shows all prices at which you 
can sell an asset (no offers at the moment). 
Select a price and click “Sell”
Here you specify a price for which you would like to sell 
one unit of the asset. Click the button to make the offer
Here you specify a price for which you would like to buy 
one unit of the asset. Click the button to make the offer
Financial Market for Managers
This column shows all prices at which trades 
have been made (only one trade so far)
This column shows all prices at which workers 
can buy an asset. 
This column shows all prices at which 
workers can sell an asset (no offers at the 
moment). 
• When the financial market closes, the manager receives a list of 
all the trading prices.
• The manager will complete two tasks:
1. The manager will decide whether to invest additional resources 
into the project.
2. The manager will report her belief (on a scale from 0 to 100) 
about the likelihood that the state of the project is good.
• One of these two tasks will be randomly selected to determine the 
manager’s payment for a particular round.
Manager’s Decision
Manager’s Decision
This column repeats all prices at 
which trades have been made
Decision 1: Enter a number 
between 0 and 100
Decision 2: Select one of the two 
options
Press OK once you are finished
• If the manager’s investment decision is randomly selected for 
payment, then her payoff is calculated as follows:
– The manager incurs a cost of 30 tokens if she decides to invest 
additional resources into the project.
– The manager receives a salary of 30 tokens regardless of 
whether the project deadline is met.
– The manager receives a bonus of 60 tokens only if the project 
deadline is met.
Manager’s Payoff: Investment Decision
• If the manager’s reported belief is randomly selected for payment, 
then her payoff is calculated as follows:
– The manager reports her belief about the likelihood that the state 
of the project is good.  Call the reported belief r.  It can be any 
number from 0 to 100.
– The manager is paid based on the accuracy of her reported belief.
– If the state of the world is good, then the manager earns
∗ 	 	 	 tokens.
– If the state of the world is bad, then the manager earns
∗ 	tokens.
Manager’s Payoff: Reported Belief
Example
Suppose you are a manager and you believe that there is a 50% 
chance that the state of the project is good (true belief = 50%).
Reported beliefs Token earnings 
if state is good
Token earnings 
if state is bad
Expected token 
earnings
0% 0 90 45
10% 17.1 89.1 53.1
20% 32.4 86.4 59.4
30% 45.9 81.9 63.9
40% 57.6 75.6 66.6
50% 67.5 67.5 67.5
60% 75.6 57.6 66.6
70% 81.9 45.9 63.9
80% 86.4 32.4 59.4
90% 89.1 17.1 53.1
100% 90 0 45
Advice
• If you want to maximize your expected token earnings from 
reporting beliefs, then you should report your true beliefs!
• In each group (8 workers and 4 managers), the investment decision of 
ONE manager is randomly selected to determine workers’ payoffs.
• The workers keep their token holdings.
• The workers’ asset holdings pay out depending on whether the project 
deadline is met:
– If the project deadline is met, each unit of the asset pays 10 tokens.
– If the project deadline is not met, each unit of the asset pays 0 tokens.




Project deadline is NOT met Project deadline is met
Project deadline is met Project deadline is met
State of the project is bad State of the project is good
Manager does NOT invest
Manager invests
1. The state of the project is randomly determined.  Workers, but not managers, 
are informed of the state of the project.
2. Workers receive a token endowment of 40 tokens and an asset endowment of 
4 units.  Workers participate in a financial market where they are free to 
buy/sell units of the asset.  Each unit of the asset pays 10 tokens if the project 
deadline is met.
3. The manager observes the financial market and then completes two tasks: she 
decides whether to invest additional resources into the project and she reports 
her belief about the likelihood that the state of the project is good.
4. Payoffs are calculated based on the state of the project, the decisions made in 
the experiment, and whether the project deadline is met.  Payoffs are reported 
to you on the computer screen.
Timeline of an Experimental Round
• Your final earnings in the experiment are the sum of the following items:
• £5 show-up payment
• payment from 1 randomly selected round
• payment from short task
• You will be paid privately and in cash at the end of the experiment.
• You need not tell any other participant how much you have earned.
How Final Earnings are Calculated
• If there are no questions, we will now begin the actual 
experiment.
• Good luck!
Let the Experiment Begin!
Message from the CEO 
 
Dear colleagues, 
I am very pleased to announce the introduction of our internal financial markets. In 
these markets, as you have already heard, workers can trade units of an asset that will 
pay out only if the project deadline is met. 
My vision is that these new markets can help our managers to improve their decisions.  
Because workers are better informed about the state of the project, their trades and 
the resulting trading prices can provide managers with information about the need for 
additional resources. 
For example, if the state of the project is bad, then workers could reveal this 
information to the manager by trading the asset at a low price (since each unit of the 
asset will be worth 0 tokens if the project deadline is not met).  If the state of the 
project is good, then workers could reveal this information to the manager by trading 
the asset at a high price (since each unit of the asset will be worth 10 tokens if the 
project deadline is met).  The manager could then invest additional resources into the 
project if she believes that the state of the project is bad. 
In any case, everybody is free to trade as they wish. I thank all of you for your hard 
work and I look forward to your continued support. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Executive Officer 
D CEO Message for the deadline asset treatment
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Message from the CEO 
 
Dear colleagues, 
I am very pleased to announce the introduction of our internal financial markets. In 
these markets, as you have already heard, workers can trade units of an asset that will 
pay out only if the manager decides to invest additional resources into the project. 
My vision is that these new markets can help our managers to improve their decisions. 
Because workers are better informed about the state of the project, their trades and 
the resulting trading prices can provide managers with information about the need for 
additional resources. 
For example, if the state of the project is bad, then workers could reveal this 
information to the manager by trading the asset at a high price (since each unit of the 
asset will be worth 10 tokens if the manager decides to invest).  If the state of the 
project is good, then workers could reveal this information to the manager by trading 
the asset at a low price (since each unit of the asset will be worth 0 tokens if the 
manager decides not to invest).  The manager could then invest additional resources 
into the project if she believes that the state of the project is bad. 
In any case, everybody is free to trade as they wish. I thank all of you for your hard 
work and I look forward to your continued support. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Executive Officer 
E CEO Message for the action asset treatment
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